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Young: Young: NASD Applications Require Arbitration of Employment Disputes

NASD Applications Require
Arbitration of Employment Disputes
Mouton v. Metropolitan Life InsuranceCo.'

I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA) mandate favoring arbitration,
numerous statutory claims are subjected to arbitration. For employment disputes
falling under Title VII, competing approaches based on whether the employment
agreement was a union or a non-union agreement, have been adopted.3 Union
agreements to arbitrate employment disputes are generally not compelled to
arbitrate. Conversely, in a non-union employment agreement, broad arbitration
clauses are interpreted to require arbitration of Title VII claims. These inconsistent
rules have been applied to the detriment of non-union employees.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Andre Mouton was employed by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company as a
sales agent.4 Metropolitan is a member of the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD), which required Mouton to be licensed by NASD. 5 In 1989,
Mouton completed the Uniform Application of Securities Industry Regulation 6 to
become licensed.' By signing the application, Mouton agreed to "arbitrate any
dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between [him] and [his] firm, or a
customer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules,
constitutions or by-laws of the [NASD] as may be amended from time to time".' In

1. 147 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1998).
2. Norris Case, Arbitration of Workplace Discrimination Claims: FederalLaw and Compulsory

Arbitration, 14 TOURo L. REv. 839, 847 (1998).
3. Id. at 851.
4. Mouton, 147 F.3d at 454.
5. Id.
6. The Uniform Application of Securities Industry Regulation is also known as a U-4 Registration.
Id.

7. Id.
8. At the time of signing the NASD in 1989 the Code section 1 provided arbitration was required for:
[A]ny dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or in connection with the business of
any member of the Association, with the exception of disputes involving the insurance
business of any member which is also an insurance company: (2) between or among

members and public customers, or others.
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1993, amendments were made to NASD rules, 9 but Mouton never filed a new U-4
registration after the amendments were made.' °
In 1995, Mouton was on disability leave," but he testified for a co-worker in a
Title VII sexual harassment action brought against Metropolitan. 2 After testifying
and upon his return to work, Mouton was subjected to unlawful employment actions
which resulted in his termination and the granting of a right to sue letter by the
EEOC. 3
Mouton filed a Title VII complaint in December 1996.14 Based on the NASD
agreement signed by Mouton, Metropolitan asked for a summary judgment."' The
district court denied the motion because a genuine issue of material fact existed as
to whether Mouton was required to arbitrate his Title VII claim under the 1989
version of the agreement; however, the district court did grant a stay
of further
6
proceedings until an appeal of the summary judgment was complete.'
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's denial of
Metropolitan's summary judgment motion, stating that under the NASD rules Title
VII actions require arbitration even for pre-amendment disputes. 7

11.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Two opposing rules have developed with respect to compulsory arbitration of
employment discrimination claims based on whether the workplace is union or nonunion.'" Union workers are not compelled to arbitrate employment discrimination
claims under collective bargaining agreements, but non-union employees must
arbitrate claims when an arbitration clause exists in the employment contract.' 9
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,20 the Supreme Court held that an employee is
not barred from a judicial determination in an employment discrimination claim if
arbitration proceedings occurred under a collective bargaining agreement. 2' An
employee who exercises her collectively bargained rights does not waive her
individual rights under Title VIIV Because Title VII rights are individual rights, a

9. The amended rules state:
[Tihe arbitration of any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or in connection with
the business of any member of the [NASD] or arising out of the employment or termination
of employment of associated person(s) with any member, with the exception of disputes
involving the insurance business of any member which is also an insurance company.
Id. at 455.
10. Id.
11. Mouton was on leave because a of work-related accident that occurred in 1994. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Case, supra note 2, at 839.
19. Id.

20. 415 U.S. 36(1974).
21. Case, supra note 2, at 840.
22. Id.
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collective bargaining agreement made by a group cannot act as a waiver of the
individual's right.2"
In 1991, the Supreme Court again reviewed mandatory arbitration agreements
in employment contracts.24 In Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., the plaintiff
was required to register with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), which
subjected him to regulations requiring arbitration of "[a] controversy between a
registered representative and any member or member organization arising out of the
5
employment or termination of employment of such registered representative." 226
employer.
his
against
claim
Gilmer subsequently brought an age discrimination
Relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in Alexander, the district court denied a
motion to compel arbitration.2 ' This ruling was later reversed by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals.2"
In reviewing the issue, the Supreme Court highlighted the Federal Arbitration
Act's mandate favoring arbitration of disputes, and held that arbitration can be used
to resolve statutory claims unless the legislature specifically addresses a preclusion.2
Since the ADEA does not specifically preclude arbitration, Gilmer allows arbitration
of such disputes.3"
Even though the result reached in Gilmer was different than the earlier decision
in Alexander, Alexander was not overruled."' Under Gilmer, a distinction was made
between contractual rights under a collective bargaining agreement and an
individual's statutory rights.32
Since Gilmer, courts have generally enforced compulsory arbitration of
employment disputes arising in non-union contracts.33 A few courts, however, have4
avoided compulsory arbitration by applying Alexander and distinguishing Gilmer.1
The Ninth Circuit used public policy in PrudentialInsuranceCo. ofAmerica v. Lai"
arguing that victims of harassment could not knowingly agree to submit disputes to
arbitration by registering with NASD. 6 In Prudential,for example, the employees
signed the U-4 form, but were not given an opportunity to read the form and were
told they were applying to take a required test." Arbitration was never mentioned
to the employees and they were never given a NASD Manual that contained the
arbitration terms.38 The court determined there was no valid agreement to arbitrate
because they did not "knowingly contract to forego their statutory remedies in favor

23. Id. at 843-44.
24. Id. at 845.

25. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 24.
28. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 1990).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
Id.
Case, supra note 2, at 851.
Id.
Id. at 854.

34. Id.

35.
36.
37.
38.

42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
Case, supra note 2, at 854.
Prudential,42 F.3d at 1301.
Id.
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of arbitration."39 Similarly, in a Seventh Circuit case, Farrand v. Lutheran
Brotherhood,40 the court found that an employer could not compel arbitration
because the NASD arbitration clause, unlike the NYSE rules in Gilmer, did not
specifically require arbitration of employment disputes."'
Conflicting decisions based on union and non-union contracts as well as
differing results in circuit courts for non-union contracts leaves confusion in
deciding if compulsory arbitration clauses will be enforced in employment disputes.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the court first addressed whether the NASD code, prior to its
1993 amendments, requires the employment dispute brought by Mouton to be
arbitrated. 42 If the pre-1993 NASD Code required arbitration by the broad language
in the arbitration clause, then the court did not need to decide the effect of the 1993
amendments, which included language requiring arbitration of disputes "arising out
of [the] employment or termination of employment." ' The court had three primary
reasons for following the majority of other circuits upholding such mandatory
arbitration agreements."
First, the court noted that in 1987 NASD had made it clear that the arbitration
provisions included "employment disputes between its members and their registered
representatives, such as securities dealers. '' 45 The court also pointed to an
explanation of the 1993 amendments that stated that the new language was not meant
to broaden any category subject to arbitration, but only to "clarify that employeremployee dispute[s] indeed fell within the ambit of the Code's arbitration
provisions. ,,46
Second, the court looked at public policy issues that favor arbitration of such
disputes.47 The primary focus was the Federal Arbitration Act's policy that "any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration."'8 The court stated that there was no doubt employment-related claims
were subject to arbitration under the pre-1993 Code, but even if the provisions were
ambiguous the ambiguity would be resolved in favor of arbitration.49

39. Id. at 1305.
40. 993 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993).
41. Case, supra note 2, at 856.
42. Mouton, 147 F.3d at 455.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Proposed Rule Change by National Association of Securities Dealers Relating
to Amendments to Code of Arbitration Procedure, 52 Fed. Reg. 9232 (1987)).
46. Id. (citing Filing of Proposed Rule Change by National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
Relating to Enforcement of Arbitrators' Orders Under the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, 58 Fed.
Reg. 39070, 39071 (1993)).
47. Id. at 456.
48. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
49. Id.
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Finally, the court looked at a prior case involving a Title VII claim, Rojas v. TK
Communications,Inc.,' ° in which the court stated that the arbitration clause need not
explicitly refer to employment-related disputes in order to mandate arbitration.5
Language in an arbitration clause, including "other disputes," was broad enough to
encompass Title VII claims. 2 The court concluded that the clause where Mouton
"agreed to arbitrate 'any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between
[himself] and [Metropolitan]"' was broad enough to encompass a Title VII claim.53
Next, the court addressed whether Mouton's claim fell under the exception to
arbitration for "disputes involving the insurance business of any member which is
also an insurance company."' The court followed two circuits in rejecting this
argument.55 In the Third Circuit, the case of In re PrudentialInsurance Co. of
America Sales PracticeLitigation5 6 held that under the NASD Code the intent was
to require arbitration of employment disputes but not insurance claims, and, since a
retaliation claim is unrelated to the insurance business, it was subject to arbitration.57
The Tenth Circuit has also addressed the issue in Armyo v. PrudentialInsurance Co.
ofAmerica,5 8 stating "there is nothing unique about these discrimination claims by
plaintiffs that involve the insurance business of prudential." 59 Mouton's claim
likewise involved only Metropolitan's obligation as an employer, not as an insurer. °
Any other decision would render meaningless arbitration agreements where
companies are involved in the insurance business and have NASD-licensed
employers.6'
Lastly, Mouton argued that "he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his
access to a judicial forum., 6 2 Applying the decision in Rojas that the arbitration
clause need not explicitly refer to employment disputes, the court held Mouton
agreed to arbitrate "any dispute, claim or controversy. 63
Based on the broad scope of the NASD arbitration provision, the public policy
concerns favoring arbitration, and the fact that the claim did not fall under the
insurance exception, the court concluded that Mouton was required to arbitrate his
Title VII claim.6

50. 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996).
51. Mouton, 147 F.3d at 456.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 133 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1998).
57. Mouton, 147 F.3d at 456 (citing In re PrudentialIns. Co., 133 F.3d at 234).
58. 72 F.3d 793 (10th Cir. 1995).
59. Mouton, 147 F.3d at 457 (quoting Armijo v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 72 F.3d 793, 800 (10th
Cir. 1995)).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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V. COMMENT
Under the court's decision in Mouton, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals joined
the majority of other circuits who generally favor compulsory arbitration.65 The
Ninth and Seventh Circuits have avoided compulsory arbitration of employment
disputes, still relying in part on the decision reached in Alexander." As a majority
of Circuit Courts of Appeals adopt the approach of compulsory arbitration of
employment disputes for non-union employees, two contrasting rules for resolution
of employment disputes are left. As a result, confusion has developed in the
employment contracting setting.
Union employees cannot collectively bargain away or waive an individual
right.67 In Alexander, the court noted the importance of the individual's right to
bring a discrimination action. 68 In light of the importance of this right, a non-union
employee should not waive this right without knowingly entering into such an
agreement. The decision in Gilmer on which the majority of courts now rely, drew
a distinction between union and non-union employees due to the fact that the union's
collective bargaining agreements acted to destroy an individual right.'
This
majority in the Court of Appeals fai to appreciate the similarities between collective
bargaining agreements and the mandatory registration with NASD for securities
dealers.
Securities dealers such as Mouton are required to complete the U-4 application
in order to register with NASD. Included in the application and registration is a
broad mandatory arbitration clause. The individual's rights waived by such an
application and registration form are especially significant in the employment
dispute context.
First, as argued in Gilmer, employers have significant bargaining power over
employees.70 When an employer is required to arbitrate as a condition of
employment, concern develops over the involuntary waiver of access to the judicial
forum. The right to adjudication is an individual right that should not be waived by
a mandatory registration requirement. A forum needs to exist for bargaining
between the employer and employee over the waiver of access to the judicial forum
and mandatory arbitration.
Second, many employees may sign the registration forms without knowing they
are waiving a right. For example, when an employee signs the U-4 form which
subjects her to a broad arbitration clause she must also realize that the arbitration
clause includes portions of the NASD code. The employee must look to a separate
document than those signed to understand the full reach of the arbitration clause. In
Prudential,the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce an arbitration
clause contained in the NASD rules because the appellant was never given copies of

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Case, supra note 2, at 857.
See Case, supra note 2, at 854.
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51-52.
Id.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34-35.
Id. at 32-33.
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the NASD manual." A requirement of knowingly agreeing to arbitrate under the U4 registration should at least be required for non-union employees.
Finally, even though the general rule under the FAA is to allow arbitration in the
employment dispute setting, the employer is at an advantage. The bias toward
employers stems from their routine contact with arbitrators and procedures. Gilmer
addressed this concern by pointing out that significant procedural mechanisms were
in place by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in agreements made by those
required to register with NYSE. 2 The advantage enjoyed by employers can be cured
by procedural safeguards used to protect employees.
The FAA mandate favoring arbitration changed the attitude of courts toward
arbitration, but this policy created conflicting rules that gave greater rights to union
employees. Applying an inconsistent policy toward non-union employees has a
tremendous impact on employee rights under Title VII. If a union employee does
not waive her right by signing a collective bargaining agreement, it follows that a
non-union employee should not be able waive her right by registering with NASD.
Certain factors should specifically be addressed when applying the NASD arbitration
clause to employment disputes, such as (1) if a registration is mandatory, (2) if the
clause was knowingly agreed to, and (3) if procedures exist to ensure fairness in the
arbitration proceedings.
Mandatory registration with associations such as NASD leaves the employee
with no meaningful choice about arbitration. To keep her job, an employee must
sign the form and agree to arbitrate. This lack of choice is comparable to union
employees who cannot waive their individual right to bring suit by belonging to the
union. The distinction between union and non-union employees unfairly allows
enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses in registration contracts, but disallows
such enforcement in the collective bargaining context.
When mandatory registration is required, special attention should focus on the
employee "knowing" that employment disputes will be subjected to arbitration. As
the court in Prudentialhighlighted, the employee should "knowingly contract to
forego their statutory remedies."73 The form should focus attention on the arbitration
clause by placing it in bold or capitol letters in the text and the NASD Manual should
be provided to employees and posted in the workplace.
Lastly, as noted by the Gilmer court, procedures should exist to ensure fairness
in the arbitration proceedings.74 The Gilmer court offered several meaningful
suggestions to eliminate the bias toward the employer, including: information about
the arbitrator's employment history and background, and an offering the employee
the ability to make a peremptory challenge of the arbitrator chosen by the
employer." It is argued that these factors would help to ensure fairness once
arbitration is compelled.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Prudential,42 F.3d at 1304.
Gilmer. 500 U.S. at 30-32.
Prudential,42 F.3d at 1305.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-32.
Id. at 30; see Case, supra note 2, at 849.
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If a distinction is made between union and non-union employment contracts,
safeguards should be considered to make sure non-union employees are also not
76
"forego[ing] their statutory remedies" without knowledge that they are doing so.

VI. CONCLUSION
Employment contracts containing arbitration clauses are increasingly being
applied to Title VII claims brought by employers." These agreements have been
upheld by a majority of circuits following the decision in Gilmer.7" The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals joined the majority of circuits favoring this policy without fully
appreciating the fact that few distinctions actually exists between signing a collective
bargaining agreement and signing NASD registration forms.
CHRISTINA S. YOUNG

76. Prudential,42 F.3d at 1305.
77. Case, supra note 2, at 854-57.
78. Id. at 862.
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